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Abstract 
We systematically examine the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms 
since the 1970's. Standard trade theory suggests that reforms that lower barriers to goods and migrants 
should have similar distributional effects, hurting low-skilled U.S. workers while benefiting high-
skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled-
labor abundant districts are more likely to support both trade and migration liberalization. Still, 
important differences exist: Democrats favor trade reforms less than Republicans, while the opposite is 
true for immigration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape support for 
immigration, but not for trade. 
 
 
 
Key words: Trade reforms, immigration reforms, roll-call votes 
JEL: F1; F22 
 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Trade Programme.  The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
 
We wish to thank Richard Baldwin, Michel Beine, Brian Burgoon, Christian Dustmann, Peter Egger, 
Gordon Hanson, Sebastian Kessing, James Markusen, Anna Maria Mayda, Douglas Nelson, Francesc 
Ortega, Hillel Rapoport, Assaf Razin, and Ray Riezman and audiences at several conferences and 
seminars. We are also indebted to Silvia Cerisola and Christian Wolf for excellent research assistance. 
 Paola Conconi, Université Libre de Bruxelles, CEPR, CESifo and Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics. Giovanni Facchini, University of Nottingham, Università 
degli Studi di Milano, CEPR, CES-Ifo, IZA and LdA. Max F. Steinhardt, Helmut Schmidt University, 
HWWI, IZA and LdA. Maurizio Zanardi, Lancaster University Management School. 
 
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
 
 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 
 
 
 
 P. Conconi, G. Facchini, M.F. Steinhardt and M. Zanardi, submitted 2018. 
1 Introduction
What drives politicians’ decisions to support or oppose policies that lower barriers to trade
and migration flows? Decisions on trade and migration policies are often seen as being shaped
by different drivers. For example, in a survey of trade and migration policy, Greenaway and
Nelson (2006) argue that “the domestic politics of international trade seems to differ in
fundamental ways from the domestic politics of immigration...” (p. 295) and suggest that,
while material interests are paramount in explaining the formation of trade policy, non-
economic considerations are key to understand migration policy.1
In this paper, we show instead that politicians’ decisions on trade and migration reforms
are shaped by a common economic driver: the skill composition of their constituencies. Stan-
dard trade theory suggests that reforms that lower barriers to flows of goods and migrants
should have similar distributional effects, hurting low-skilled U.S. workers while benefiting
high-skilled workers. To formalize this idea and guide our empirical analysis, we describe
a simple two-country, two-goods Heckscher-Ohlin model in which Home – representing the
United States – is skilled-labor abundant, whereas Foreign – representing the rest of the
world – is unskilled-labor abundant. Home is divided in electoral districts that differ in
their endowments of skilled and unskilled labor. Each district is represented by an elected
politician, whose objective is to maximize the well-being of voters’ in his constituency. We
consider politicians’ decisions on two reforms: trade liberalization and liberalization of the
inflow of unskilled migrants. In this simple setting, as long as factor endowment differences
between Home and Foreign are not too large, a legislator is more likely to support trade or
migration liberalization the more skilled-labor abundant his district is.
To assess the validity of the model’s predictions, we build on a novel dataset that combines
final passage votes on trade liberalization and immigration reforms introduced since the early
1970’s. We focus on the behavior of U.S. Representatives, matching their votes to a wealth of
individual- and district-level characteristics that capture both economic and non-economic
drivers.
Our empirical analysis shows that economic drivers that work through the labor market
play an important role in shaping legislators’ voting behavior on both trade and migration
1The important role played by non-economic drivers has also been emphasized by the literature on the
determinants of public opinion towards immigration (e.g. Mayda, 2006; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; and
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006) and in the historical account of the determinants of migration policy by
Timmer and Williamson (1996). Looking at the experience of the New World between 1860 and 1930,
Collins et al. (1999) suggest that “policy did not behave as if New World politicians and voters thought
trade and immigration were substitutes” (p. 252).
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policies. In particular, we find that representatives from more skilled-labor abundant dis-
tricts are more likely to support both trade liberalization and a more open stance vis-a`-vis
unskilled immigration, in line with the key prediction of our model. In terms of magnitudes,
our benchmark results indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of skilled indi-
viduals in a congressional district leads approximately to a 0.8 percentage points increase in
the probability that the district’s representative supports trade liberalization, and to a 1.7
percentage point increase in the probability that he supports the liberalization of unskilled
immigration. To appreciate the size of the effect, these estimates imply that increasing a dis-
trict’s skill ratio from the 30th to the 70th percentile would increase the probability of a vote
in favor of trade and immigration liberalization by 10.6 and and 48.1 percent, respectively.
At the same time, in line with previous studies on trade and migration policies, our
results confirm the existence of important differences between the drivers of these policies.
First, welfare state considerations play an important role in shaping support for immigration,
as representatives of richer and more unequal constituencies are less likely to support open
immigration policies, whereas this is not true when it comes to trade. Second, party affiliation
plays an important role, but its effect is different across policy areas. Democratic legislators
are systematically more likely to support the liberalization of migration policies than their
Republican counterparts, whereas the opposite is true when it comes to trade policy. Finally,
our findings suggest that non-economic factors linked to the ethnic composition of the district
affect legislators’ decisions on migration, but have no impact on trade policy choices.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the first attempt to systematically
compare the drivers of legislators’ decisions on immigration and trade policy in the United
States: previous studies examine the determinants of trade and migration policies separately.
A large literature examines the trade policy choices in the U.S. Congress. Destler (2005)
offers a detailed historical and political account of U.S. trade policy-making since 1934.
Several recent papers focus instead on the role of economic determinants of trade policy
decisions. Hiscox (2002) considers the impact of factor endowments and industry interests in
shaping thirty important trade bills introduced between 1824 and 1994. Baldwin and Magee
(2000) investigate the role of lobbying efforts in shaping congressional votes, examining three
important trade policy measures introduced in the nineties. Blonigen and Figlio (1998)
examine the role of foreign direct investment on U.S. senators’ voting behavior on trade
policy between 1985-1994. More recently, Conconi et al. (2012) analyze the role of strategic
delegation motives in shaping the congressmen’s support for fast track authority, whereas
Conconi et al. (2014) consider the impact of term length and election proximity on votes on
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trade liberalization.
There is also a growing literature on the political economy of migration policy in the
U.S. The study by Goldin (1994) of the introduction of the literacy test represents one of the
first contributions in the economics literature. Gimpel and Edwards (1999) is probably the
most comprehensive review to date of the politics of immigration policy in Congress, but only
limited attention is dedicated to the analysis of economic determinants. Several papers focus
on the introduction of a single piece of legislation or a narrow set of legislative initiatives.
For instance, Hatton (2015) looks at the 1965 US Immigration and Nationality Act and its
long lasting consequences. Gonzalez and Kamdar (2000) analyze instead the 1996 Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and find that representatives of
districts characterized by a higher share of workers employed in low-skill intensive industries
tend to favor immigration restrictions. Fetzer (2006) obtains similar results in his analysis of
voting on the 2005 Border protection, Anti-terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act.
Considering all migration policy measures directly affecting the supply of foreign workers in
the post 1970 period, Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) find robust evidence that district-level
economic determinants play an important role. Similar evidence is also reported by Milner
and Tingley (2011), who emphasize also the heterogeneous role played by economic drivers,
depending on the nature of the immigration policy being considered.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical
model to guide our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes our data, whereas Section 4
presents our main results and a series of robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we describe a simple theoretical framework to highlight the fact that, in stan-
dard trade models based on differences in factor endowments, the liberalization of migration
and trade can have similar labor market implications.3 Consider a model with two countries
c = H,F that use two factors, (human) capital and labor, to produce two goods, X and Y .4
Both sectors employ constant returns to scale production functions, and the two countries
share identical technologies. Good X is labor-intensive, whereas good Y is capital-intensive.
Country H and country F are endowed with the same amount of capital KH = KL = K,
2For an interesting account of the impact of immigration on support for the Democratic and Republic
parties in U.S. elections, see Mayda et al. (2016).
3For examples of models where trade and migration are instead complements, see Markusen (1983), Iranzo
and Peri (2009), and Bougheas and Nelson (2013).
4The theoretical framework is inspired by the work of Benhabib (1996).
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whereas the foreign country has more labor L at its disposal, so that LF > LH . Consumers
i share identical homothetic preferences both within and across countries, and as a result
their indirect utility takes the simple form V (p, Ii) = V (p)Ii where p is the prevailing price
vector and Ii is individual i’s income.
The Home country is partitioned in d districts, where d = 1, ..., D, each inhabited by
the same number N of citizens. Each citizen of the Home country supplies 1/N units of
labor and Ki units of capital. As a result, Kd =
∑
i∈dKi is the total capital available in the
district, whereas the labor supply of each district is given by Ld = 1 ∀d. For simplicity, we
assume instead that individuals in country F are either endowed with labor, or with capital.5
Consider two possible scenarios. In the first, country H and F move from autarky to
free trade. In the second, the two countries completely liberalize labor flows between each
other, and individuals relocating abroad consume their income in the destination country.
For simplicity, trade and migration are assumed to be costless.
As long as the initial factor endowment differences are not too big, standard theory (e.g.
Mundell, 1957; Dixit and Norman, 1980; and Wellisch and Walz, 1998) suggests that both
liberalizing trade and liberalizing labor flows will allow to replicate the integrated equilib-
rium, i.e. the outcome that would emerge if the two countries were to merge completely.
Given that we are in a standard Heckscher-Ohlin setting, moving from autarky to the in-
tegrated equilibrium volves a decline in the relative price of good X in Home, a decline in
the real return to labor, and an increase in the real return to capital. In the free trade
equilibrium, the Home country exports the capital intensive good Y and imports the labor
intensive good X. At the same time, in the free migration equilibrium, it receives an inflow
of workers from the foreign country, which leads to a decline in the domestic wages and an
increase in the return to capital.
Assume now that each district is represented by a legislator. In choosing whether to
support a policy that liberalizes migration or trade, district d’s representative maximizes
the well-being of the citizens of his or her constituency, which is given by
∑
i∈d V (p, Ii) =∑
i∈d V (p)Ii. It follows that:
Proposition 1 In the capital-abundant country, the likelihood that a district representative
will support a more open trade or migration policy increases in the capital-to-labor ratio of
his or her district.
Proof. The income of district d’s average resident is given by Id = w
1
N
+rKd
N
. In the capital-
5As a result, only workers will potentially migrate from F to H, whereas capitalists are assumed to be
immobile across countries.
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abundant country, trade liberalization leads to a decline in the wage w and an increase in
the return to capital r. As a result, the larger is Kd, the greater is the improvement in the
representative citizen’s income and welfare. An inflow of foreign workers will have the same
effect on factor returns and thus on income and welfare.
Our simple model thus suggests that legislators’ voting behavior on trade and migration
liberalization reforms should be crucially affected by their district’s skill ratio, which de-
termines the expected labor marker effects of these reforms. In particular, representatives
of districts with a higher capital-to-labor ratio should be more likely to support bills that
liberalize trade or migration. This is the key prediction that we bring to the data.
3 Data
Our dataset draws on a number of different sources. We collect information on all legislative
votes on trade and migration issues in the U.S. House of Representatives during the period
1970-2006 using the Congressional Roll Call Voting Dataset of the Policy Agenda Project and
the Library of Congress (THOMAS). Since these datasets provide only limited information
about the content of each bill, we have supplemented them using additional sources, like
the Congressional Quarterly publications and existing historical accounts like the ones by
Gimpel and Edwards (1999) and Destler (2005). Section A-1 in the Appendix briefly reviews
the main developments in the congressional history of trade and migration policy in recent
decades.
In the case of trade policy, we focus on all major trade bills, covering the ratification of
bilateral or multilateral trade agreements and the extension of fast track trade negotiating
authority (see Conconi et al., 2012, 2014). With respect to immigration policy, we consider
all bills that have a potential impact on the supply of unskilled labor (i.e. that either
regulate legal immigration or tackle illegal immigration). In particular, following Facchini
and Steinhardt (2011), we focus on bills that can have a direct (positive or negative) impact
on the size of the unskilled labor force in the United States.6 Tables A-1 and A-2 in the
Appendix provide details of all the votes included in our analysis.
Next, we combine our data on trade and immigration bills with the corresponding records
of individual voting behavior of House representatives. This information is provided by the
Voteview project (http://voteview.ucsd.edu) of Poole and Rosenthal (1997). In addition, the
6We restrict our attention to final passage votes, which determine whether a bill clears the House or not.
In doing so, we exclude votes on amendments, to avoid including multiple decisions on the same legislation.
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Voteview database includes information on congressmen’s name, party affiliation, state of
residence, and congressional district, which enable us to link legislators to their constituen-
cies. Information on districts that have been reapportioned after each census was obtained
instead from Jacobson (2004). With respect to information on representatives’ age and gen-
der, we use data from three sources: up to 2000, we rely on ICPSR Study number 7803 and
the database built by Swift et al. (2000); from 2001 onwards, we rely on data provided by the
Biographical Directory of the US Congress. Finally, we match our data on individual vot-
ing records with information on the economic and non-economic characteristics of electoral
constituencies. For this purpose, we use data from the Congressional District Data Files
of Adler (2003) and Lublin (1997), who have aggregated Census data at the congressional-
district level, taking into account the decennial redistricting. We supplement them using
information taken directly from the U.S. Census whenever needed.
Our main sample includes votes on 17 trade bills and 12 migration bills (see Tables A-1
and A-2). In our benchmark analysis, we use all the votes but to insure that our findings are
not driven by differences in the timing of the voting and in the sample size across the two
types of policies, we also carry out the analysis on a sub-sample of matched bills, restricting
our attention to those trade and immigration votes that took place in the same year.7
Our dependent variables are the representative’s votes on bills regulating trade (V ote
Tradeijt), and immigration (V ote Migrationijt). In the case of bills liberalizing trade or
migration, a vote coded 1 indicates that the district’s representative i votes in favor of more
open trade or immigration, and 0 otherwise. In the case of legislation restricting trade or
immigration, a vote is coded 0 if the representative votes in favor of a restrictive policy and
1 otherwise.
The main explanatory variable of interest is Skill Ratiodt, which measures the pro-
portion of high-skilled individuals in the total population over 25 years of age at time t
in congressional district d. High-skilled individuals are defined as those having earned at
least a bachelor’s degree. Based on our theoretical model, we would expect this variable to
have a significative and positive effect on the likelihood that district representatives support
both open trade or immigration policies. We also experiment with an alternative measure,
Skill Ratio Occupationdt, which captures the share of individuals over 16 that are employed
in executive, administrative, managerial and professional specialty occupations.
7In a few instances, more than one immigration or trade policy initiative was voted upon in a given year.
In these cases, we use the date of the vote as the selection criterion, matching bills that are chronologically
closer to each other. This leaves us with six sets of votes (those denoted with “*” in Tables A-1 and A-2).
We have verified that our results are robust to using alternative samples of matched votes.
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We include in our analysis a set of standard individual-level controls. To capture ideology,
we use the dummy variable Democrati, which takes value 1 if the representative is a member
of the Democratic party. In some specifications, we further account for regional differences
among Democrats by including a dummy coded as equal to 1 if the representative belongs
to a Northern state (Northern Democrati).
8 As an alternative time-varying measure of a
legislator’s ideology, we use the first dimension of the DW nominate score, DW Nominateit,
which increases in an individual’s conservative orientation.9 Individual level demographic
characteristics have been shown to play a significant role in shaping individual attitudes to-
wards trade and migration (e.g. Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; and Facchini and Mayda, 2009).
We thus include the variables Ageit and Femalei in our analysis. The last individual-level
controls we use are proxies for the influence of lobbying groups on U.S. representatives.
In particular, we employ data on labor and corporate Political Action Committees (PACs)
contributions received by individual congressmen, provided by the Federal Election Commis-
sion starting from 1979. As these campaign contributions are given to politicians to influence
their decisions on a variety of policy issues, we use the dummy variable PAC Corporateit
(PAC Laborit) to classify a politician to be “influenced” by corporate (labor) contributions
if he/she has received contributions that are above the eightieth percentile of all corporate
(labor) contributions received by individual representatives in that year.10
Although our main focus is on the role of the workforce skill composition, we control for
additional economic characteristics of congressional districts. The literature on public opin-
ions on trade and migration has emphasized that the redistribution among different groups
within society carried out by the welfare state is an important driver of preferences towards
globalization (e.g. Hanson, et al., 2007; and Mayda et al., 2007). Previous studies suggest
that legislators from wealthier constituencies are less in favor of unskilled immigration, as
they are likely to be net receivers of public benefits and services (Boeri et al., 2002; and
Hanson, et al., 2007). Also, congressmen elected in more unequal constituencies should be
less likely to support immigration, if inequality leads to more redistribution (Meltzer and
Richard, 1981). To capture the role of welfare state drivers in our analysis, we have thus
constructed the variables Median Family Incomedt and Inequalitydt. The first measures
the median family income in the district; the second is the ratio between the mean and the
8Several studies of U.S. congressmen’s votes distinguish between Northern and Southern Democrats (e.g.
Peltzman, 1985). We follow Brewer et al. (2002) and define the North as including Connecticut, Delaware,
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
9The DW-nominate score is provided by the Voteview project and is constrained to lie between 1 and -1.
10We have experimented with different thresholds, and our key results are unaffected.
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median family income.11
In some specifications, we include additional economic characteristics of districts, which
might affect representatives’ trade and migration votes: the variable Farm Workerdt mea-
sures the share of individuals in the labor force employed in agriculture; the variable Export Ratiodt
is defined as the ratio between the total manufacturing employment in exporting and import-
competing sectors in a district (see Conconi et al., 2014).
Using Census data, we have also constructed proxies for the degree of urbanization of the
district and its ethnic composition: the variable Urbandt captures the share of the population
living in urban areas; the variable Foreign Borndt measures the share of foreign-born in the
district’s population; Hispanicdt is the share of individuals of Hispanic origin in the total
population; and the variable African Americandt is the share of blacks in the population.
In addition to controlling for the ideological orientation of the individual congressmen,
in some robustness checks we use two measures to control for the ideological leaning of a
district. The first is Share Democratdt, the share of Democratic votes in the past election;
the second is instead the dummy variable Liberaldt, which is constructed based on a question
asked in the American National Election Study to assess the liberal/conservative orientation
of individual respondents. Liberaldt takes a value of one if the share of people who identify
themselves as liberals in the population is larger than the corresponding national average in
a given decade.12
Table A-3 in the Appendix provides summary statistics for all the variables used in our
empirical analysis. As we can see, there is a broad difference in support for trade and migra-
tion: in only 37% of the observations a representative voted in favor of freer immigration,
while the corresponding figure for trade was 65%. Turning to our main explanatory variable,
Skill Ratiodt, on average one out of five Americans holds at least a bachelor’s degree. The
descriptive statistics also show that there is strong variation in the skill ratio across congres-
sional districts, which we will exploit in our empirical analysis to verify whether there is a
systematic relationship between a representative’s voting behavior on trade and migration
and the skill composition of his/her home district.
11Following Hanson et al. (2007), we have constructed an alternative measure of fiscal exposure, using
state-level information on public spending on Welfare, Health, and Education. If we replace our district-level
measures with this state-level proxy for the fiscal burden of migrants, we find that it has no significant impact
on House representatives’ votes on trade and migration (and our results on skill composition are unaffected).
12The exact wording of the question used is “We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and con-
servatives. Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from
extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you
thought much about this?” We excluded from the analysis the “Don’t know” replies. We coded as liberal
those respondents who define themselves as being “Extremely liberal”, “Liberal”, or “Slightly liberal”.
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Figure 1 illustrates the main mechanism highlighted in our theoretical model. As an
example, we focus on the most recent trade and migration votes in our matched sample: the
Approval of the US-Oman Free Trade Area of 2006 (H.R. 5684) and the Secure Fence Act
of 2006 (H.R. 661). The three figures in the top panel depict the congressional districts in
Georgia, a state with a skill composition that closely resembles the U.S. average (the fraction
of working age individuals with a college degree or above is in both cases approximately 24%).
The figure on the left illustrates the share of highly skilled in the population. The dark-
shaded areas are skilled-labor abundant districts in 2006.13 The figure in the middle captures
district representatives who supported the trade liberalization initiative, whereas the figure
on the right illustrates representatives who voted against the immigration restrictive measure.
As it can be seen, almost all congressmen who supported a more open trade policy and voted
against restrictive immigration legislation represented districts with skill ratios above the
average.
Figure 1: Example of congressional votes on trade and migration bills
Skill	ratio,	Georgia,	109th	Congress		 Trade,	Voting	on	H.R.	5684	 Immigration,	Voting	on	H.R.	6061	
In the three figures in the bottom panel, we magnify the districts around the state’s
largest city and capital, Atlanta. This figures highlight the divide along party lines on im-
migration and trade policy. For instance, Republican Congressmen Price and Lindner –
13They are defined as those for which more than 24% of the population has at least a college degree.
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representing the skilled-labor abundant districts 6 and 7 of the state – supported immigra-
tion restrictions. By contrast, Democratic Congressman Lewis, who represented skilled-labor
abundant district 5, voted against trade liberalizing H.R. 5684. In our empirical analysis, we
will systematically explore the role of skill composition, party affiliation, and other charac-
teristics of the legislators and their constituencies in explaining votes on trade and migration
policies.
4 Empirical analysis
Our simple theoretical model shows that a representative’s voting behavior on trade and
immigration is a function of the skill composition of his constituency. The main predic-
tion is that a district’s skill composition affects a representative’s voting behavior on trade
and migration liberalization bills in the same direction. In particular, legislators from more
skilled-labor abundant districts should be more likely to support liberalizing unskilled mi-
gration as well as trade. In this section, we assess the empirical relevance of this hypothesis
by running separate probit regressions on the full sample of trade and migration votes and
verify that the results are robust to a battery of different specifications. Next, we employ
alternative econometric techniques, which exploit different sources of variation in the data.
First, given the long span of our sample, we can include legislators’ fixed effect to control
for any time-invariant characteristics of politicians. Second, we focus on a set of matched
votes, in which a trade and a migration measure came to the House floor during the same
Congress, to study the behavior of the same individuals on votes that occurred close to each
other.
4.1 Benchmark results
We start by providing results based on the full sample of all trade and immigration bills, and
by comparing the voting behavior of different congressmen on the same bill. More precisely,
we estimate two separate probit models for trade and migration bills:
V ote Tradeidt = β11Xit + β12Xdt + It + Is + 1 (1)
V ote Migrationidt = β21Xit + β22Xdt + It + Is + 2 (2)
where V ote Tradeidt and V ote Migrationidt are respectively dichotomous variables taking a
value of one if representative i from district d votes in favor of a bill liberalizing trade and
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unskilled migration, in year t. Xit and Xdt are matrices of explanatory variables specific to
legislator i and district d, It and Is are year and state dummies to account for unobserved
time- and state-specific effects, and 1 and 2 are error terms clustered by state x decade.
14
The results of this first set of estimations are shown in Table 1. Columns 1-2 contain
the findings for congressmen’s votes on trade policy, while columns 3-4 present those on
migration policy. In order to simplify the interpretation, we report marginal effects computed
at the mean of each variable. Thus, our estimates capture the change in the probability of
voting in favor of a more open trade (immigration) policy, due to an infinitesimal change
in each continuous explanatory variable, and a discrete change for dichotomous explanatory
variables.
Column 1 shows the results of a parsimonious specification for trade votes, in which we
only include the skill ratio and the main characteristics of the legislator, together with state
and year fixed effects. In line with the key prediction of our model, we find that legislators
from more skill-abundant districts are more likely to vote in favor of trade liberalization, and
the effect is significant at the one percent level. Furthremore, Republican representatives
are more likely to support trade liberalization than their Democratic counterparts – and this
result is in line with previous studies highlighting that Democrats are systematically more
protectionist than Republicans during the period we consider (e.g. Blonigen and Figlio, 1998;
Baldwin and Magee, 2000; Conconi et al., 2012 and 2014). Furthermore, the likelihood to
support trade liberalization decreases with the representative’s age (see also Conconi et al.,
2012) and female members of the House are more protectionist than their male counterparts,
in line with previous studies on individuals’ attitudes toward trade (e.g. Mayda and Rodrik,
2005).
In columns 2, we control for additional characteristics of the legislators’ constituencies.
In particular, we include Log(Median Family Incomedt) and Inequalitydt, to proxy for
the role of welfare state determinants (see Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011), as well as socio-
demographic characteristics of the district (importance of urban centers and ethnic compo-
sition). The impact of the district’s skill composition remains highly significant, while other
district characteristics are mostly insignificant.
14The use of district fixed effects over a long time horizon is not feasible since the geographic definition
of congressional districts changes following each decennial census. For the same reason, we can not cluster
errors at the district level.
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Table 1
Trade and migration votes, benchmark results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
trade votes migration votes
Skill Ratiodt 0.798*** 0.821*** 0.378*** 1.707***
(0.139) (0.294) (0.142) (0.316)
Democrati -0.432*** -0.411*** 0.543*** 0.434***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.034) (0.029)
Femalei -0.044** -0.036* 0.120*** 0.063*
(0.022) (0.021) (0.039) (0.034)
Ageit -0.014 -0.013 0.006 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Log(Median Family Income)dt 0.032 -0.485***
(0.152) (0.145)
Inequalitydt -0.082 -0.389**
(0.158) (0.155)
Urbandt 0.058 0.053
(0.110) (0.110)
Foreign Borndt -0.391 0.836**
(0.246) (0.339)
African Americandt -0.151 0.574***
(0.139) (0.138)
Hispanicdt 0.221* 0.513***
(0.134) (0.155)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,986 6,986 4,733 4,733
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.39
Predicted probability 0.71 0.71 0.31 0.31
Notes: The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. The de-
pendent variable for trade votes (migration votes) is V ote Tradeidt and
(V ote Migrationidt), a dummy equal to 1 if representative i elected in district d
votes in favor of a trade liberalization (migration liberalization) bill at time t, 0
otherwise. Robust standard errors, clustered by state x decade, are reported in
parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
In terms of magnitude, the results of these specifications suggest that factor endowments
play an important role in shaping voting behavior on trade: a 1 percentage point increase
in the skill ratio in a congressional district leads to a 0.8 percentage point increase in the
probability that the district’s representative supports trade liberalization. Taking into ac-
count that the predicted probability of a vote in favor of trade liberalization is 71 percent,
our estimates imply that the effect is in the order of 1.1 percent increase for every percentage
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point increase in the skill ratio.15 Put differently, increasing a district’s skill ratio from the
30th to 70th percentile would increase the probability that its representative votes pro trade
by 10.6 percent.
Columns 3-4 of Table 1 follow the same structure as columns 1-2 for votes on immigration
policy. In line with the key prediction of our theoretical model, we find that legislators from
more skilled-labor abundant districts are more likely to support immigration policies aiming
to liberalize the inflow of unskilled migrants. This finding mirrors our previous results for
trade votes, and highlights an important common driver of politicians’ decisions on trade
and immigration policies. In terms of magnitude, based on the results reported in column
4, a 1 percentage point increase in the skill ratio in a congressional district leads to a
1.7 percentage point increase in the probability that the district’s representative supports
immigration liberalization. Given that the predicted probability a pro-migration vote is 31
percent, these estimates imply that increasing a district’s skill ratio from the 30th to 70th
percentile would increase the probability of a pro-migration vote by 48.1 percent.
Concerning the other determinants of migration votes, we find that Democratic represen-
tatives are more likely to support immigration liberalization than their Republican counter-
parts, in line with previous studies on migration policy (e.g. Mayda et al., 2016). This result
stands in sharp contrast with what we have found for trade policy bills.16 Furthermore, our
estimates suggest that female members of Congress are more likely to support immigration
liberalization. As for the welfare state variables, our results suggests that legislators from
wealthier constituencies are less likely to support unskilled immigration, as they are likely to
be net contributors of public benefits and services (Boeri et al., 2002; Hanson, et al., 2007).
We also find that congressmen elected in more unequal constituencies are less likely to sup-
port immigration, in line with the idea that more inequality leads to more redistribution
(Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Finally, legislators representing districts with a higher share of
foreign-born, Hispanics, and African-Americans are more likely to support liberalization of
unskilled immigration. These results are likely to be driven by social and family networks,
as well as by the identification with ethnic minorities.17
To summarize, the estimates from the full sample provide strong support for the predic-
tions of our model. In particular, we find robust evidence that the district’s skill composition
15This result is obtained by dividing the marginal effect of the variable Skill Ratiodt (0.8) by the average
predicted probability of a vote in favor of trade liberalization reported at the bottom of the table (0.71).
16One possible explanation is that Democratic congressmen are aware of the fact that unskilled immigration
changes the electoral composition in a way that increases the political support for redistribution in the long
run (Ortega, 2005 and 2010). The latter is likely to strengthen the future position of the Democratic party.
17For a detailed discussion see Facchini and Steinhardt (2011).
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affects legislators’ voting behavior on trade and migration liberalization bills in the same di-
rection. Our results also indicate the presence of three important differences in the drivers
of support for the two facets of globalization. First, members of the Democratic party are
more likely to favor liberal immigration legislation than members of the Republican party,
while the opposite is true for trade liberalization. Second, female representatives are more
likely to support immigration liberalization, but they are less likely to support trade liber-
alization. Finally, welfare state considerations and the districts’ ethnic composition affect
congressmen’s decisions on immigration policy, but have no impact on trade policy.
4.2 Robustness checks
In the remaining of this section, we discuss a series of estimations we have carried out to
verify the robustness of our results on the determinants of trade and migration votes. In
particular, we address possible concerns about omitted variables and the possible inclusion
of additional political and economic controls. To save on space, we focus on our preferred
specification, which includes district-level controls.
4.2.1 Omitted variable concerns
The results of Table 1 show that the variable Skill Ratiodt has always a positive and signif-
icant effect on legislators’ support for both trade and migration reforms. Our interpretation
of this finding is that these two types of reforms have similar labor effects for the legislators’
constituencies, in line with the theoretical model described in Section 2.
One might be concerned that, instead of reflecting the labor market effects of trade
and migration reforms, the positive coefficient of the Skill Ratiodt variable could be driven
by the fact that skilled workers tend to be more liberal open minded, and generally more
supportive of globalization (e.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006, 2007). If this is the case,
our results could be driven by an omitted variable, the open-mindedness of voters in a
legislator’s constituency, correlated with both the skill composition of the district and the
voting behavior of the legislator. To deal with this concern, in Table 2, we reproduce the
benchmark specifications of Table 1, including two alternative proxies for how liberal voters
in a district are.
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Table 2
Trade and migration votes, dealing with omitted variables concerns
(1) (2) (3) (4)
trade votes migration votes trade votes migration votes
Skill Ratiodt 0.805*** 1.701*** 0.818*** 1.695***
(0.297) (0.316) (0.297) (0.313)
Democrati -0.412*** 0.433*** -0.381*** 0.381***
(0.038) (0.029) (0.036) (0.034)
Femalei -0.036* 0.064* -0.034 0.064*
(0.021) (0.034) (0.021) (0.033)
Ageit -0.013 0.003 -0.013 0.002
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012)
Log(Median Family Income)dt 0.036 -0.484*** 0.029 -0.467***
(0.153) (0.146) (0.154) (0.143)
Inequalitydt -0.107 -0.397*** -0.076 -0.405***
(0.156) (0.153) (0.160) (0.156)
Urbandt 0.045 0.046 0.055 0.058
(0.109) (0.111) (0.109) (0.110)
Foreign Borndt -0.395 0.834** -0.356 0.804**
(0.251) (0.341) (0.247) (0.348)
African Americandt -0.152 0.572*** -0.117 0.529***
(0.137) (0.138) (0.137) (0.141)
Hispanicdt 0.234* 0.518*** 0.223* 0.527***
(0.137) (0.155) (0.131) (0.160)
Liberaldt 0.045** 0.018
(0.022) (0.017)
Share Democratsdt -0.092 0.141**
(0.074) (0.072)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,986 4,733 6,937 4,717
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.39 0.31 0.39
Predicted probability 0.71 0.31 0.70 0.30
Notes: The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. The dependent variable for trade
votes (migration votes) is V ote Tradeidt and (V ote Migrationidt), a dummy equal to 1 if repre-
sentative i elected in district d votes in favor of a trade liberalization (migration liberalization)
bill at time t, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors, clustered by state x decade, are reported in
parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
In columns 1-2, we directly control for the degree of open-mindedness of citizens in
a constituency by including the variable Liberaldt, constructed based on voter’s opinions
recorded in the American National Election Study. This dummy variable takes a value of 1
if the share of people who identify themselves as liberal in the population of a given district
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is larger than the corresponding national average in a given decade.18 We find that, while
districts with a more liberal electorate tend to support both more open trade and migration
policies, the effect is not statistically significant for the latter. Importantly, the variable
Skill Ratiodt continues to have a positive and significant effect (at the 1 percent level) on
both trade and immigration votes, thus suggesting that the effect we have uncovered is not
simply due to the fact that more skilled abundant districts are simply more open minded.
In columns 3-4, we include instead the variable Share Democratsdt as a proxy for the
district’s ideological orientation. We find that congressmen from districts with a higher share
of Democratic voters are more likely to support bills liberalizing immigration, while we do
not find any significant influence on trade voting behavior. Again, the coefficient of the
variable Skill Ratiodt remains positive and significant at the 1 percent level.
4.2.2 Alternative or additional political and economic controls
We now verify whether our result are robust to using alternative or additional political and
economic controls. In Table 3, we start with political determinants. In columns 1-2, we
replace the party affiliation dummy with the DW nominate score, to control for the time-
varying ideological stance of a lawmaker. We find that more conservative politicians are
more likely to support trade liberalization and less likely to support immigration liberaliza-
tion. The marginal effects for Skill Ratiodt are larger in magnitude in comparison with the
specifications of Table 1 and remain significant at the 1 percent level.
In columns 3-4, we include a dummy coded as equal to 1 if the representative belongs
to a Northern state (Northern Democrati), in line with some previous studies on congres-
sional votes (e.g. Brewer et al., 2002). Ceteris paribus, Southern Democrats are around
32 percentage points less likely to support trade liberalization than Republicans, and that
this effect increases to around 54 percentage points for Northern Democrats. Skill Ratiodt
continues to have a positive and significant effect on the likelihood that legislators support
both trade and migration reforms.
Finally, in columns 5-6 we include information on organized lobbying groups, which have
received great attention both in the trade literature (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1994;
Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000) and in the literature on
migration (e.g. Facchini, and Willmann, 2005; Hanson and Spilimbergo, 2001; Facchini et
al., 2011). In particular, we include variables focusing on the role played by contributions
offered by corporations (PAC Corporateit) and by unions (PAC Laborit). In line with
18The correlation between Liberaldt and Skill Ratiodt is 0.24.
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previous studies (e.g. Baldwin and Magee, 2000), we find that larger contributions by labor
organizations are associated with a more protectionist stance on trade liberalization, whereas
larger contributions by business related lobbies have the opposite effect. By contrast, the
variables PAC Corporateit and PAC Laborit are not significant for migration policy. This is
in line with the findings of Facchini et al. (2011), who show that PAC contributions are not a
significant driver of immigration policy, whereas the opposite is true for lobbying expenditure
directly related to migration policy. Again, we find that representatives of districts with a
more skilled labor force are more likely to support both trade and migration reforms.
Table 3
Trade and migration votes, political controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
trade votes migration votes trade votes migration votes trade votes migration votes
Skill Ratiodt 1.145*** 1.300*** 0.695** 1.715*** 0.694** 1.635***
(0.279) (0.303) (0.291) (0.323) (0.302) (0.374)
Democrati -0.321*** 0.427*** -0.358*** 0.479***
(0.048) (0.042) (0.044) (0.035)
Northern Democrati -0.222*** 0.015
(0.069) (0.070)
DW Nominateit 0.528*** -0.677***
(0.052) (0.040)
PAC Laborit -0.111*** 0.028
(0.026) (0.031)
PAC Corporateit 0.178*** -0.019
(0.027) (0.030)
Femalei -0.015 0.035 -0.047** 0.064* -0.027 0.080**
(0.021) (0.030) (0.020) (0.033) (0.021) (0.036)
Ageit -0.006 -0.005 -0.014 0.003 -0.018** -0.000
(0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014)
Log(Median Family Income)dt -0.047 -0.336** 0.018 -0.484*** 0.043 -0.416**
(0.137) (0.139) (0.148) (0.144) (0.162) (0.175)
Inequalitydt -0.121 -0.278* -0.033 -0.391** -0.094 -0.451***
(0.165) (0.156) (0.149) (0.154) (0.154) (0.169)
Urbandt 0.068 0.005 0.140 0.049 0.109 0.008
(0.106) (0.103) (0.106) (0.105) (0.115) (0.115)
Foreign Borndt -0.357 0.727** -0.332 0.831** -0.305 1.166***
(0.224) (0.336) (0.268) (0.339) (0.218) (0.399)
African Americandt 0.005 0.324** -0.190 0.576*** -0.170 0.853***
(0.129) (0.130) (0.131) (0.138) (0.139) (0.155)
Hispanicdt 0.321** 0.384** 0.128 0.520*** 0.200 0.570***
(0.130) (0.155) (0.130) (0.152) (0.144) (0.214)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,985 4,730 6,986 4,733 6,659 4,155
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.42 0.31 0.39 0.32 0.42
Predicted probability 0.70 0.29 0.70 0.31 0.71 0.34
Notes: The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. The dependent variable for trade votes (migration votes) is V ote
Tradeidt and (V ote Migrationidt), a dummy equal to 1 if representative i elected in district d votes in favor of a trade liberalization
(migration liberalization) bill at time t, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors, clustered by state x decade, are reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Next, Table 4 reports the results when further economic controls are added to our pre-
ferred specification. In columns 1-2, we replace the share of highly skilled individuals in a
district with a variable based on occupation. In particular, Skill Ratio Occupationdt mea-
sures the percentage of individuals over 16 employed in executive, administrative, managerial
and professional specialty occupations. Once again, we find that representatives of districts
characterized by a larger share of high skilled individuals are more likely to support the
liberalization of both trade and immigration.
Table 4
Trade and migration votes, economic controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
trade votes migration votes trade votes migration votes trade votes migration votes
Skill Ratiodt 0.841*** 1.709*** 0.818*** 1.706***
(0.287) (0.314) (0.293) (0.316)
Skill Ratio Occupationdt 0.609* 2.359***
(0.358) (0.408)
Democrati -0.410*** 0.435*** -0.410*** 0.435*** -0.410*** 0.434***
(0.038) (0.029) (0.038) (0.029) (0.038) (0.029)
Femalei -0.012 0.003 -0.010 0.003 -0.036* 0.063*
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.021) (0.034)
Ageit -0.012 0.003 -0.010 0.003 -0.013 0.003
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012)
Log(Median Family Income)dt 0.121 -0.510*** 0.050 -0.470*** 0.031 -0.487***
(0.151) (0.153) (0.150) (0.140) (0.151) (0.146)
Inequalitydt 0.021 -0.532*** -0.124 -0.408*** -0.084 -0.389**
(0.160) (0.173) (0.159) (0.158) (0.110) (0.110)
Urbandt 0.073 0.033 0.155 0.089 0.057 0.052
(0.110) (0.108) (0.114) (0.133) (0.158) (0.154)
Foreign Borndt -0.304 1.035*** -0.320 0.852** -0.383 0.841**
(0.231) (0.325) (0.239) (0.339) -0.153 0.572***
African Americandt -0.147 0.651*** -0.147 0.580*** (0.246) (0.339)
(0.138) (0.133) (0.136) (0.135) (0.139) (0.138)
Hispanicdt 0.181 0.519*** 0.173 0.499*** 0.215 0.510***
(0.134) (0.143) (0.134) (0.161) (0.133) (0.155)
Farm Workerdt 1.566*** 0.521
(0.544) (0.761)
Export Ratiodt 0.023 0.018
(0.040) (0.040)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,986 4,733 6,986 4,733 6,986 4,733
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.39 0.31 0.39 0.31 0.39
Predicted probability 0.70 0.30 0.71 0.30 0.71 0.31
Notes: The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. The dependent variable for trade votes (migration votes) is V ote
Tradeidt and (V ote Migrationidt), a dummy equal to 1 if representative i elected in district d votes in favor of a trade liberalization
(migration liberalization) bill at time t, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors, clustered by state x decade, are reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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In column 3-4, we add to our benchmark specification the share of farm workers within
a district. The results indicate that this variable has a positive effect on legislator’s support
for trade liberalization, but no significant effect on their stance on migration votes. The
effect of Skill Ratiodt continues to be positive and significant for both trade and migration
votes.
Finally, in columns 5-6 we include the variable Export Ratiodt, which captures a district’s
dependence on export relative to import-competing jobs. This is constructed as the ratio
between the total manufacturing employment in exporting and import-competing sectors in
district d and year t (see Conconi et al., 2014). The results indicate that export orientation
has no significant effect on trade and migration votes, while the effect of skill composition
continues to be in line with our model’s prediction. In conclusion, neither extra political
and economic controls affect our benchmark findings, though some provide further insights
on the determinants of congressmen’s voting behavior.
4.3 Alternative econometric methodologies
In our analysis so far, we have controlled for a variety of individual-level characteristics of the
legislator, but we may still be concerned that individual level unobservables might influence
representatives’ voting behavior, biasing our estimates. Since our sample spans a period of
four decades, we have information on the votes that the same representative has cast on
different migration and trade bills. We can thus exploit the time variation in the voting
behavior of individual representatives, estimating the following linear probability models:
V ote Tradeidt = β11Xit + β12Xdt + It + Ii + 1 (3)
V ote Migrationidt = β21Xit + β22Xdt + It + Ii + 2 (4)
where Ii is a congressman’s fixed effect.
19 In these specifications, we only exploit time
variation in districts’ skill composition to verify the key prediction of our theoretical model.
However, the inclusion of legislator fixed effects implies that we cannot account for observable
time-invariant individual characteristics like gender or party affiliation (or age since we always
include year effects). We can, however, control for the time-varying ideological stance of the
lawmaker by using his DW nominate score, as we have done in Table 3.
19Due to the incidental parameter problem, we cannot run a probit estimation with individual fixed effects.
However, we have experimented using a conditional logit specification, and the patterns are similar.
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Table 5
Trade and migration votes, alternative econometric methodologies
Linear probability model Bivariate probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
trade votes migration votes trade votes migration votes
Skill Ratiodt 0.653* 1.421** 2.090** 4.804***
(0.347) (0.626) (1.022) (1.223)
DW Nominateit 0.852*** -0.490**
(0.173) (0.190)
Democrati -1.488*** 1.676***
(0.088) (0.128)
Log(Median Family Income)dt -0.211 -0.436** 0.014 -1.721***
(0.138) (0.213) (0.393) (0.621)
Inequalitydt -0.187 -0.150 -0.422 -1.358**
(0.223) (0.328) (0.637) (0.541)
Urbandt 0.098 -0.382* -0.012 0.710
(0.138) (0.229) (0.314) (0.468)
Foreign Borndt -0.311 0.796 -1.076 3.219**
(0.381) (0.590) (0.987) (1.420)
African Americandt -0.180 0.071 -0.392 0.523
(0.198) (0.391) (0.439) (0.635)
Hispanicdt 0.295 -0.265 0.795** 0.534
(0.314) (0.558) (0.349) (0.652)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legislator effects Yes Yes No No
State effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 6,987 4,751 2,297
R2 0.60 0.66
Predicted probability 0.65 0.32
Wald test (p-value) 0.09
Notes: The first two columns report the coefficients from a linear probability model, while the
last two columns reports the coefficients of a bivariate probit model. The dependent variable for
trade votes (migration votes) is V ote Tradeidt and (V ote Migrationidt), a dummy equal to 1 if
representative i elected in district d votes in favor of a trade liberalization (migration liberaliza-
tion) bill at time t, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered by
legislator in columns 1-2, and by state x decade in columns 3-4. *** Significant at 1%, ** signifi-
cant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
The results of estimating the linear probability model are reported in columns 1-2 of
Table 5.20 As it can be immediately seen, our key findings continue to hold. In particular,
20The small difference in the number of observations between these specifications and the corresponding
specifications in columns 2 and 4 of Table 1 is due to the fact that congressmen from two states (i.e. New
Hampshire and Wyoming) have voted in every instance in favor of trade and against immigration. These
observations are dropped in the probit model because of the inclusion of state fixed effects.
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our analysis indicates that an increase in the share of highly skilled residents in a district
increases the probability that the representative supports both measures liberalizing trade
and immigration. We also find that welfare state considerations continue to play a role in
shaping voting behavior on immigration policy, but not on trade policy. Finally, the results
confirm that legislators’ ideology has a different impact on their voting behavior on trade
and migration reforms: more liberal legislators are more likely to support opening borders
to goods, but less likely to support opening borders to unskilled migrants.
Our analysis so far has been based on the full sample of all trade and immigration votes.
One may be concerned that our findings could be driven by dissimilarities in sample structure,
i.e. differences in the number of trade and immigration reforms and in the timing of these
reforms. The latter in particular could imply that different individuals are called upon voting
on trade and immigration initiatives. Furthermore, the decisions on trade and immigration
of each legislator might be interrelated, i.e. might be affected by common characteristics of
the legislator and of his or her district. If this is the case, the error terms of the two probit
models in (1) and (2) are likely to be correlated. To address these concerns, we restrict our
attention to the sample of matched bills (described in Tables A-1 and A-2 in the Appendix21)
and estimate a bivariate probit model. This estimator assumes that the error terms in the
regressions on trade and migration votes consist of one component (uk, k = 1, 2) that is
unique to each model and a second component (η) that is common to both models. More
specifically,
1 = η + u1
2 = η + u2
with the covariance between the errors tested as part of the estimation results.
The coefficient estimates of the bivariate probit regressions are reported in columns 3-4
of Table 5. Note that the Wald test for whether the covariance of the error terms 1 and 2 is
equal to zero is only borderline significant at 10 percent (i.e. p-value of 0.09 reported at the
21We have also tried to restrict the analysis to matches that involve at least one major trade and/or im-
migration reform (H.R. 10710/H.R. 891, H.R. 4800/H.R. 3810, H.R. 4848/H.R. 4222 and H.R. 4340/H.R.
4437 ). Also, in constructing our matched sample, we used chronological proximity as the matching criterion.
In 1988 two important pieces of trade legislation came to the floor within less than a month: H.R. 4848, i.e.
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act and H.R. 5090, the approval of the Canada U.S. Free Trade
Area. In the same year, H.R. 4222, a bill extending the legalization program introduced by IRCA came to
the floor. In our benchmark analysis H.R. 4848 was matched with H.R. 4222; matching H.R. 5090 with H.R.
4222 yields very similar results. Our results are robust to using these two alternative samples of matched
votes. In particular, the effects of the district’s skill composition are almost identical in size for trade and
immigration reforms.
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bottom of the table), indicating that there is limited evidence that congressmen’s decisions
on trade and migration policies are correlated. In addition, the results are very similar to
those in the corresponding specifications of Table 1, based on the probit regressions using
the full sample of votes. In particular, legislators from more highly skilled districts are more
likely to support liberalization of both trade and immigration. Our estimates also confirm the
important differences in the drivers of the two policies: Democratic legislators are more likely
to support liberal immigration legislation than Republican legislators; fiscal exposure and
ethnic networks have a significant impact on congressmen’s votes on immigration reforms,
but have no effect on their decisions on trade reforms.
In terms of estimated magnitude, the conditional marginal effect of a one percentage
point increase in the share of skilled individuals on support for trade liberalization is between
0.85 and 0.94 percentage points while the corresponding effect for migration liberalization
is between 1.72 and 1.86 percentage points.22 Interestingly, these effects and the implied
changes on probability of passing a bill are almost identical to the ones obtained in our
benchmark regressions. In conclusion, the impact of the skill measure obtained from the
matched sample using the bivariate probit model is very close to the one obtained running
separate probit models using the entire sample of votes.
5 Conclusions
This paper represents the first attempt to systematically investigate and compare the drivers
of legislators’ choices on trade and migration policy.
To guide our empirical analysis, we have developed a simple theoretical model that em-
phasizes the importance of the skill composition of a constituency. Our framework indicates
that representatives of constituencies in which skilled labor is more abundant should be
more likely to favor a policy liberalizing trade or increasing unskilled immigration. We have
empirically assessed this prediction using a new dataset, which includes all U.S. House of
Representatives final passage votes on trade and immigration policy over the period 1970-
2006.
While the earlier literature emphasizes the differences between policy making in these
two areas, our analysis suggests the presence of an important common driver, namely a
district’s factor endowment. In particular, we find evidence consistent with the predictions
22Marginal effects for each outcome of a bivariate probit model should be calculated conditional on the
other outcome (i.e. conditional marginal effects) because the two equations are not independent. For this
reason, we report two conditional marginal effects for our variable of interest in each of the two set of votes.
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of a standard trade model: representatives of more skilled-labor abundant constituencies are
more likely to support liberalizing both trade and immigration. This finding is robust to
including a variety of controls, and using different econometric methodologies and sample
structures. Importantly, the effect of the skill composition also continues to hold when we
directly control for the constituency’s liberal orientation, suggesting that it cannot simply
be driven by the fact that more skilled abundant districts tend to be more open minded.
Our results also confirm important differences in the drivers of trade and migration pol-
icy, which can help explaining why politicians are often more reluctant to reduce barriers to
low-skilled migrants than to goods, notwithstanding the large potential gains from further
migration liberalization.23 In particular, our analysis suggests that welfare state considera-
tions play an important role in shaping the support for immigration, whereas this is not true
when it comes to trade liberalization. We also highlight significant ideological differences:
Democratic legislators are systematically more likely to support the liberalization of migra-
tion policies than their Republican counterparts, while the opposite is true when it comes
to trade policy. Finally, non-economic factors that work through immigrant networks have
an impact on legislators’ support for migration, but not for trade.
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Appendix
A-1 An overview of U.S. trade and migration policy
The votes included in our sample cover four decades, a period during which the United States
has engaged in a series of important measures to further liberalize trade, and immigration
flows have soared to levels seen only at the beginning of the twentieth century. In this
section, we provide a brief overview of the main policy initiatives that have been introduced
in this period in the two areas. For a list of the bills considered in our study, see Tables A-1
and A-2.
1970-1980
The early seventies saw the U.S. economy in a deep recession following the first oil crisis. In
dealing with the consequences of this shock, Congress reacted differently when it turned to
trade and migration policies. Concerning the former, a liberal agenda was pursued, whereas
for the latter, lawmakers tried to put limits to the substantial increase in immigrant flows
that had followed the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act.
The two main trade bills introduced in the House during this period were the Trade Act of
1974, which established Fast Track Authority (FTA), and the ratification of the GATT Tokyo
Round agreements in 1979. Under FTA, Congress’ delegates to the U.S. President the power
to carry out trade negotiations for a certain time period, constraining itself to only accept or
reject the agreements that have been submitted for approval. Many observers have argued
that FTA has been a key instrument in the successful completion of the trade negotiations
carried out by the U.S. since its introduction. The ratification of the Tokyo Round of
the GATT resulted instead in major multilateral tariff reductions for industrial products
(averaging 35%), some important reduction in tariffs for tropical agricultural products, a
series of measures involving non technical barriers to trade, and the implementation of the
so called “Anti-Dumping code”.
As for migration policy, Congress reacted to the first major oil crisis introducing two
restrictionist amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965: the first
(H.R. 392 of 1973) contained provisions to tackle the growing number of illegal immigrants,
whereas the second (H.R. 891 of 1973) extended the applicability of the 20,000 per-country
cap to migrants from the Western hemisphere. This initiative was aimed at limiting immi-
gration from Mexico (Gimpel and Edwards, 1999).
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1980-1990
The eighties started with the U.S. experiencing the deepest downturn since the Great De-
pression. However, when President Reagan was re-elected to a second term in 1984, the
economy was growing again. When the 99th Congress convened in 1985, trade was very high
on the political agenda, and lawmakers were broadly inclined to increase the competitiveness
of the U.S. economy in the international market place. However, the Omnibus Trade Bill
of 1986 (H.R. 4800) included some clearly protectionist measures, like the famous Gephardt
(D, MO) amendment prescribing the introduction of quotas on imports from countries that
maintained both a large bilateral trade surplus with the United States and unfair import
barriers (Schwab, 1994). The legislation easily passed in the House and was labeled by the
White House as “pure protectionism”, an “action that would be trade destroying, not trade
creating” (Destler, 2005). Notwithstanding initial support, the bill stalled in the Senate, and
the measure died with the 99th Congress.
By 1987, both chambers had a Democratic majority and trade became once again a pri-
ority. Work started swiftly on new legislation, resulting in the introduction of H.R. 4848,
which followed closely in the steps of H.R. 4800, but contained important pro-trade provi-
sions and removed the most protectionist measures (in particular the controversial Gephardt
amendment). After a back and forth with the Reagan administration, which resulted in some
further watering down of the most protectionist provisions, H.R. 4848 cleared the House in
July 1988, with very strong bipartisan support. The last important trade provision intro-
duced in this decade is H.R. 5090 of 1989, with which the House ratified the creation of the
Canada-U.S. free trade area (CUSFTA). The bill led to a substantial liberalization of trade
with Canada.24
Turning to international migration, following the introduction of restrictive measures
on immigration from the Western hemisphere and the growing arrivals of refugees, much
of the policy debate during the eighties focused on illegal immigrants and asylum seekers
(Tichenor, 1994). While we exclude bills focusing on refugees from our analysis, we capture
the discussion on illegal migration by looking at various measures that have been voted on
in the House of Representatives. The two most important ones are the Simpson-Mazzoli
Bill (H.R. 1510), introduced in 1982, and the Immigration Reform and Control Act (H.R.
3810) of 1986. The two initiatives are closely intertwined, since the latter is a revised
version of the former. The first important provision of H.R. 1510 was to make it illegal
to knowingly hire or recruit undocumented immigrants, and sanctions were introduced for
those employing illegal aliens. A second major component was the requirement for employers
to attest their employees’ immigration status. Last but not least, the proposed legislation
24We do not consider in our analysis the 1985 bill on the ratification of the U.S.-Israel free trade area, as
it received unanimous approval in the House.
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granted an amnesty to certain agricultural seasonal workers and immigrants. The initiative
was highly controversial and Mazzoli decided to pull it from the floor and reintroduce it in
the new Congress in 1984 (Lowell et al., 1986; Gimpel and Edwards, 1999). Most of the
debate during this session focused on the employer sanctions and the amnesty provisions
and the bill ended up clearing the House with a 216 to 211 vote, one of the narrowest
in the whole immigration debate. The measure passed the Senate in a different version,
and no compromise was reached in the House-Senate conference committee. The push for
a comprehensive immigration reform was strong enough for a new version of the bill to be
introduced in the 99th Congress in both chambers. The Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 (H.R. 3810, IRCA) introduced a temporary program for agricultural workers, which
was requested by the agricultural lobby and strongly opposed by organized labor (Gimpel and
Edwards, 1999). Furthermore, it implemented a controversial guest-worker initiative in the
tradition of the Bracero program,25 which enabled a legal temporary inflow of unskilled farm
workers. The bill allowed almost 3.5 million illegal immigrants to be legalized as permanent
residents (LeMay, 2006). The other bill included in our analysis (H.R. 4222) was aimed at
a more generous handling of illegal immigrants and extended the legalization provisions of
the IRCA act by six months.
1990-2000
The “roaring” nineties saw the U.S. economy experiencing one of its longest, continuous
expansions. During this period, Congress embraced globalization by liberalizing both trade
and migration.
In this decade, the first trade measure included in our analysis is the extension of Fast
Track Authority, which passed the House on May 23, 1991. This initiative was important for
the conclusion of the negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and the approval of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
NAFTA was seen by many congressmen as unpopular, and the Clinton administration had
to work very hard to build support for it. In the end, Republican votes proved to be decisive
in insuring the 234-200 approval of H.R. 3450 on November 17, 1993. Negotiations on
the final touches of the Uruguay Round of the GATT lasted instead until mid December,
and led to a major trade liberalization, involving substantial tariff cuts (averaging almost
40%), the requirement that agricultural quotas be converted in tariffs, and the phasing-out
of restrictions to textile trade over a ten-year period. The actual implementation of the
agreement turned out to be more controversial than initially expected and voting on the bill
25The Bracero Program was a temporary guest worker program covering the farming sector, which was in
operation from 1942 until 1964. It allowed migrant farmworkers to come to the United States for up to nine
months annually. At its peak in 1956, it involved more than 440,000 Mexican citizens.
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took place only during the lame duck session in late 1994. Still, H.R. 5110 gained broad
bi-partisan support and cleared the floor with a comfortable 288-146 margin.
One of the reasons for the delay in the implementation of the Uruguay Round bill was
the proposal to include a seven-year extension of Fast Track Authority, deemed necessary
to implement the administration’s trade agenda. The measure immediately appeared to be
controversial, and had to be eliminated from the text of H.R. 5110. Three years later, the
Clinton administration started once again to push for renewal of Fast Track Authority, but
conflicting views led the proposal to be withdrawn in November 1997. Just before the 1998
midterm elections, the house speaker Newt Gingrich put it on the floor as H.R. 2621 to
embarrass the administration, and the measure was clearly defeated (Destler, 2005).
The nineties saw also two major initiatives concerning migration. The first was the
Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT). In contrast to IRCA, this bill focused mainly on legal
immigration and had two main goals: the revision of the existing visa allocation system and
the introduction of new provisions for skilled immigration. The major change introduced
by the legislation was the increase of the annual cap for legal permanent residents from
approximately 500,000 to 700,000. Finally, the act established also a short-term amnesty
program to grant legal residence to up to 165,000 spouses and minor children of immigrants,
who were legalized under the IRCA.
The second immigration legislation of the nineties is the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (H. R. 2202), which entered into force on September 30,
1996 and which was meant to address the problem of undocumented immigration. The act
increased the size of the U.S. Border Patrol, mandated the construction of fences at the most
heavily trafficked areas of the U.S.-Mexico border and introduced a pilot program to check
the immigration status of job applicants. Furthermore, it restricted the federal benefits to
illegal and legal migrants and made the deportation of illegal immigrants substantially easier.
2000-2006
The new century started with the burst of the dot-com bubble, and with the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001. The reaction of the U.S. Congress has been to further push trade
liberalization – mainly on a bilateral basis – and to introduce a series of measures to deal
with illegal immigration, reflecting also broad national security concerns.
During most of the Clinton administration, the executive branch did not enjoy Fast Track
Authority, and the newly elected President Bush made regaining it one of the priorities
during the first year in office. The negotiations dragged on longer than expected, and the
final passage vote took place only on July 27, 2002, with the measure clearing the House
with a very narrow margin of three votes (215-212). Fast track authority was then used
to negotiate and gain approval for a series of bilateral trade agreements, including a broad
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push to promote the creation of a Middles-East Free Trade Area. On July 24, 2003 the
House ratified the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Area and the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Area. A
year later, it was the turn of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Area and of the U.S.-Morocco
Free Trade Area. The negotiations and final approval of the the Central American Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) was instead much more controversial, with final passage vote
taking place on strict party lines and with the Democrats very concerned about labor and
environmental issues. The bill cleared the House on July 28, 2005, with a very narrow
majority of two votes (217-215). Two other free trade areas were ratified during this period:
the one with Bahrain (December 7, 2005), and the one with Oman (July 20, 2006). While
the former was uncontroversial, the approval of the agreement with Oman was subject to
a much closer scrutiny in the aftermath of a National Labor Committee report suggesting
that labor rights violations were widespread in Jordan’s export zones (Bolle, 2006).
The congressional debate on immigration policy in this period has been mainly influenced
by concerns about illegal immigration and national security. All of the bills included in our
analysis (H.R. 418, H.R. 4437, H.R. 6061, H.R. 6094, and H.R. 6095) are aimed at reducing
illegal immigration and at tightening immigration law enforcement. The most controversial
and substantial legislative proposal was the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal
Immigration Control Act of 2005 (H.R. 4437). The bill required the building of a fence
along the U.S.-Mexican border up to 700 miles long and called the federal government to
take custody of undocumented aliens detained by local authorities. The measure passed
the House of Representatives on December 16, 2005 by a vote of 239 to 182. However,
it did not pass the Senate and is therefore the only major immigration bill that did not
became public law in the period considered in our analysis. Among the other initiatives
introduced, the Real ID Act (H.R. 418) established regulations for State driver’s licenses
and new security standards for identification documents. The Community Protection Act of
2006 (H.R. 6094) contained various measures simplifying the detention of dangerous aliens,
ensuring the removal of deportable criminal aliens, and enhancing police officers’ ability to
fight alien gang crime. The Secure Fence Act (H.R. 6061) reignited the debate on a fence at
the Southern border, and led to the construction of over 700 miles of double-reinforced fence
along the border with Mexico in areas that have experienced illegal drug trafficking and illegal
immigration. Finally, the Immigration Law Enforcement Act of 2006 (H.R. 6095) intended
to strengthen the position of state and local authorities in dealing with the enforcement of
immigration laws.
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Table A-1
Final passage votes on trade liberalization reforms in the House of Representatives
Cong. Date Bill Description Dir. Yes No Sum
1* 93 11.12.1973 H.R.10710 Trade Act of 1974 Pro 272 140 412
2 96 11.07.1979 H.R.4537 Approval of Tokyo Round Agreements Pro 395 7 402
3* 99 22.05.1986 H.R.4800 Omnibus Trade Bill, incl. fast track authority Contra 295 115 410
4* 100 13.07.1988 H.R.4848 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, incl. fast track authority Pro 376 45 421
5 100 09.08.1988 H.R.5090 Approval of CUSFTA Pro 366 40 406
6 103 22.06.1993 H.R.1876 Extension of fast track authority Pro 295 126 421
7 103 17.11.1993 H.R.3450 Approval of NAFTA Pro 234 200 434
8 103 29.11.1994 H.R.5110 Approval of Uruguay Round Agreements Pro 288 146 434
9 105 25.09.1998 H.R.2621 Approval of fast track authority Pro 180 243 423
10 107 27.07.2002 H.R.3009 Approval of fast track authority; other provisions: Andean Trade Pro 215 212 427
Preference Act, trade adjustment assistance, GSP
11 108 24.07.2003 H.R.2738 Approval of US-Chile FTA Pro 270 156 426
12 108 24.07.2003 H.R.2739 Approval of US-Singapore FTA Pro 272 155 427
13 108 14.07.2004 H.R.4759 Approval of US-Australia FTA Pro 314 109 423
14 108 22.07.2004 H.R.4842 Approval of US-Morocco FTA Pro 323 99 422
15* 109 28.07.2005 H.R.3045 Approval of CAFTA Pro 217 215 432
16* 109 07.12.2005 H.R.4340 Approval of US-Bahrain FTA Pro 327 95 422
17* 109 20.07.2006 H.R.5684 Approval of US-Oman FTA Pro 221 205 426
Total number of individual roll call votes on trade legislation: 7,168
Notes: Cong. and Date describe the congress/date in which/when the vote took place. Bill shows the bill number in the House of Representa-
tives. Description provides some basic information about the content of the legislation. Dir. indicates whether the bill was pro or against trade
liberalizion. Yes/No is the overall number of Yes/No votes. Sum shows the overall number of votes. All figures are calculated on the basis of
individual voting records. FTA stands for free trade area. * denotes votes included in the matched sample of trade and migration votes.
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Table A-2
Final passage votes on immigration reforms in the House of Representatives
Cong. Date Bill Description Dir. Yes No Sum
1 93 03.05.1973 H.R.392 Employer Sanctions Contra 297 63 360
2* 93 26.09.1973 H.R.891 Rodino Bill Contra 336 30 366
3 98 20.06.1984 H.R.1510 Simpson-Mazzoli Bill Contra 216 211 427
4* 99 09.10.1986 H.R.3810 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) Pro 230 166 396
5* 100 21.04.1988 H.R.4222 Extension of legalization by 6 months Pro 213 201 414
6 101 03.10.1990 H.R.4300 The 1990 Immigration Act (IMMACT) Pro 230 192 419
7 104 21.03.1996 H.R.2202 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act Contra 333 87 420
8* 109 10.02.2005 H.R.418 Real ID Act Contra 261 161 422
9* 109 16.12.2005 H.R.4437 Border Protection, Anti-terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act Contra 239 182 421
10* 109 14.09.2006 H.R.6061 Secure Fence Act Contra 283 138 421
11 109 21.09.2006 H.R.6094 Community Protection Act of 2006 Contra 328 95 423
12 109 21.09.2006 H.R.6095 Immigration Law Enforcement Act of 2006 Contra 277 140 417
Total number of individual roll call votes on immigration legislation: 4,909
Notes: Cong. and Date describe the congress/date in which/when the vote took place. Bill shows the bill number in the House of Represen-
tatives. Description provides some basic information about the content of the legislation. Dir. indicates whether the bill was pro or against
immigration liberalizion. Yes/No is the overall number of Yes/No votes. Sum shows the overall number of votes. All figures are calculated on the
basis of individual voting records. FTA stands for free trade area. * denotes votes included in the matched sample of trade and migration votes.
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Table A-3
Summary statistics
Trade votes
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Vote Tradeidt 6,986 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00
Skill Ratioidt 6,986 0.20 0.09 0.02 0.57
Democrati 6,986 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
Femalei 6,986 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
Ageit 6,986 5.39 1.00 2.70 8.80
DW Nominateit 6,985 0.01 0.44 -0.88 1.33
Northern Democrati 6,986 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
PAC Laborit 6,659 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
PAC Corporateit 6,659 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
Log(Median Family Income)dt 6,986 10.39 0.56 8.52 11.42
Inequalitydt 6,986 1.22 0.10 0.86 1.97
Urbandt 6,986 0.77 0.21 0.13 1.00
Foreign Borndt 6,986 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.59
African Americandt 6,986 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.92
Hispanicdt 6,986 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.84
Liberaldt 6,986 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00
Share Democratsdt 6,937 0.51 0.25 0.00 1.00
Export Ratiodt 6,986 0.31 0.46 0.00 9.36
Migration votes
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Vote Migrationidt 4,733 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Skill Ratioidt 4,733 0.19 0.09 0.02 0.57
Democrati 4,733 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
Femalei 4,733 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Ageit 4,733 5.41 1.02 2.90 8.80
DW Nominateit 4,730 0.03 0.43 -0.72 1.18
Northern Democrati 4,733 0.24 0.25 0.00 1.00
PAC Laborit 4,155 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
PAC Corporateit 4,155 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
Log(Median Family Income)dt 4,733 10.26 0.61 8.52 11.42
Inequalitydt 4,733 1.21 0.10 1.02 1.97
Urbandt 4,733 0.77 0.21 0.13 1.00
Foreign Borndt 4,733 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.59
African Americandt 4,733 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.92
Hispanicdt 4,733 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.84
Liberaldt 4,733 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Share Democratsdt 4,717 0.53 0.25 0.00 1.00
Export Ratiodt 4,733 0.24 0.33 0.00 4.97
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our
empirical analysis (see Section 3 for a definition of the variables).
34
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
1563 Stephen Gibbons 
Stephan Heblich 
Ted Pinchbeck 
The Spatial Impacts of a Massive Rail 
Disinvestment Program: The Beeching Axe 
1562 Helen Johnson 
Sandra McNally 
Heather Rolfe 
Jenifer Ruiz-Valenzuela, 
Robert Savage 
Janet Vousden 
Clare Wood 
Teaching Assistants, Computers and 
Classroom Management: Evidence from a 
Randomised Control Trial 
1561 Daniel J. Graham 
Stephen Gibbons 
Quantifying Wide Economic Impacts of 
Agglomeration for Transport Appraisal: 
Existing Evidence and Future Directions 
1560 Daniel S. Jacks 
Dennis Novy 
Market Potential and Global Growth over the 
Long Twentieth Century 
1559 Alan Manning 
Paolo Masella 
Diffusion of Social Values through the Lens of 
US Newspapers 
1558 Jan David Bakker 
Stephan Maurer 
Jörn-Steffen Pischke 
Ferdinand Rauch 
Of Mice and Merchants: Trade and Growth in 
the Iron Age 
1557 Giuseppe Berlingieri 
Sara Calligaris 
Chiara Criscuolo 
The Productivity-Wage Premium: Does Size 
Still Matter in a Service Economy? 
1556 Christian A.L. Hilber 
Olivier Schöni 
The Economic Impacts of Constraining 
Second Home Investments 
1555 Filippo Di Mauro 
Fadi Hassan 
Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano 
Financial Markets and the Allocation of 
Capital: The Role of Productivity 
1554 Keith Head 
Yao Amber Li 
Asier Minondo 
Geography, Ties and Knowledge Flows: 
Evidence from Citations in Mathematics 
1553 Nicholas Bloom 
Kalina Manova 
Stephen Teng Sun 
John Van Reenen 
Zhihong Yu 
Managing Trade: Evidence from China and 
the US 
1552 Gabriel M. Ahlfeldt 
Wolfgang Maennig 
Steffen Q. Mueller 
The Generation Gap in Direct Democracy 
1551 Keith Head 
Tierry Mayer 
Brands in Motion: How Frictions Shape  
Multinational Production 
1550 Natalie Chen 
Dennis Novy 
Currency Unions, Trade and Heterogeneity 
1549 Felipe Carozzi The Role of Demand in Land Re-Development 
1548 Nick Bloom 
Brian Lucking 
John Van Reenen 
Have R&D Spillovers Changed? 
1547 Laura Alfaro 
Nick Bloom 
Paola Conconi 
Harald Fadinger 
Patrick Legros 
Andrew F. Newman 
Raffaella Sadun 
John Van Reenen 
Come Together: Firm Boundaries and 
Delegation 
1546 Jörg Kalbfuß 
Reto Odermatt 
Alois Stutzer 
Medical Marijuana Laws and Mental Health in 
the United States 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7955 7673 Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Website: http://cep.lse.ac.uk Twitter: @CEP_LSE 
